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ABSTRACT

A DISCOURSE OF TRUE AND FALSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE
AFL-CIO BETWEEN 1955-1965 AS ARCHIVED IN THE TAMIMENT LIBRARY
by
John J. Gorham, Jr.

Advisor: Ira Shor
In 1955 the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations healed
their twenty-year schism. Provisions of the NIRA and the Wagner Act had given promising
opportunities for union organization in the early 1930’s. Unions in coal and steel saw
possibilities in organizing vertically entire industries, rather than according to traditional crafts.
In 1935 some unions left the AFL to form more aggressive organizations under the banner of the
newly formed CIO. The public perception of aggressive strikes led to anti-labor laws, most
noticeably the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The increasingly hostile political climate, as states
enacted the “right to work” laws permitted by Section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley, created the
conditions for reuniting labor.
This thesis examines the decade following that reunion. Using theories of Foucault,
Bourdieu, and Habermas, it looks at the historical background of labor’s perception of itself in
the century leading up to the topic period, but focuses primarily on the AFL-CIO’s documents of
the decade 1955-1965, how those documents defined the role of unions in a democracy, the
battle of discourse in claiming the mantle of “individual freedom”, and the compromises
involved in the process of “collective bargaining.”
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Chapter 1: Introduction, “A Discourse of True and False”
Foucault stated, “My general theme isn’t society but the discourse of true and false, by
which I mean the correlative falsifiable discourses that bear on them; and it’s not just their
formation that interests me, but the effects in the real to which they are linked.“ 1 In the decade
1955-1965 the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, the umbrella
organization of American labor, engaged in a struggle over the truth or falsehood of the
American foundation myth, the liberal philosophy of John Locke, which posited personal
property as the foundation argument against despotic government. The American Constitution
enshrined Locke’s notion of property in two senses, possessing physical property and having a
property in one’s own being. For two centuries the discourse of American political life has
assumed the rectitude of Locke’s philosophy as exploitation of the continent’s natural resources
increased possibilities for white immigrants and conflated the American experience of
democracy with the economic benefits of emerging industrialization and capitalism. The thesis
of this paper is that this myth of “individual freedom” worked within American political life to
isolate the individual, thus reducing the individual’s ability to act collectively. Specifically, the
thesis will examine the discourse surrounding the collective bargaining strategy of the AFL-CIO
in the decade 1955-1965. The theories of Foucault, Bourdieu, and Habermas will act as
reference points to examine the internal conflicts and difficulties of implementing the process of
collective bargaining in a discourse controlled by the dominant theories of Lockean
individualism.

1

Michel Foucault, and Paul Rabinow, Power: Essential Works of Foucault
1954-1984, (New York: The New Press 2000) 237.
1

In the decade 1955-1965 “collective bargaining” stood at the center of the discourse
struggle within liberalism, whether it entailed “positive freedom”, the fulfillment of one’s
potential in life, or merely “negative freedom”, the right to one’s property without outside
interference. This thesis will look at the linguistic restrictions that the AFL-CIO placed upon
itself in the decade 1955-1965 by examining the archives of the AFL-CIO held in the Tamiment
Labor Library at New York University. These archives consist of pamphlets, press releases,
shop steward manuals, and magazines published by the AFL-CIO. The documents are not
complex philosophical treatises, but according to Bourdieu, we can “take an example from the
most humdrum and ordinary sphere of politics, that which we see in front of us every day . . . to
think in completely astonished and disconcerted way about things you thought you had always
understood.“2 These documents depict a decade in which the AFL-CIO seemed to be an essential
part of the American political landscape. The documents avoid a depiction of class struggle, but
rather display a struggle in discourse, in which the leaders of the AFL-CIO failed to master the
complex array of social and financial changes following WWII and the Korean War.
This decade was a high water mark for the American labor movement. In 1954 American
labor union density peaked at 34 percent of wage and salary employees in non-farm workplaces.3
As a starting point for the analysis, in 1955 the American Federation of Labor healed an almost
twenty-year schism in organized labor by reuniting with the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
This reunion forged a united front against the surging economic and social capital of American
business, which consolidated its position as partner with government in maintaining the
2Pierre

Bourdieu, et al, Language and Symbolic Power, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2003) 207.
3Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson, "The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New
Deal and Fair Deal," Studies in American Political Development19, no. 01 (Spring 2005): 29,
doi:10.1017/s0898588x05000015.
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American dream. According to Foucault, “there is no relationship of power without the means
of escape or possible flight. Every power relationship implies, at least in potential, a strategy of
struggle, in which two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not
finally become confused. Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of
possible reversal.”4

As will be expanded upon later in this thesis, a long history of

confrontations established the power relationships between the AFL-CIO and business, defining
the limits and conflicts of their struggle between 1955 and 1965.
As the closing year for this analysis, George Meany’s Labor Day on September 3, 1965
presented a high point of AFL-CIO influence on the political process. George Meany, president
of the AFL-CIO, cited the recent achievements of the AFL-CIO in achieving the legislative
victories of Johnson’s Great Society. “This is a memorable Labor Day, not only for the trade
union movement and its members, but for the nation. The will of the people, so strongly
expressed last November, has been translated with unparalleled speed and scope into legislative
action. And what a legislative record it is: Even now, with fruitful days still to come, the 89th
Congress has written an indelible chapter in American history and has opened the way to a far
better life for the generation now alive and those yet to be born.”5 Meany added a caution, which
indicated the isolation of the AFL-CIO in its dependence upon political action, “There is no
automatic assurance that future Congresses will be in the same pattern. On the contrary, political
writers are already taking it for granted that many Congressional liberals, especially new

Foucault, Essential Works, 346.
George Meany, Speech, Press Release, “News from the AFL-CIO NA.8-3870 For Labor Day
Editions of Daily Papers: Release for Use in P.M. Editions, September 3, 1965, ‘1965 Labor
Day Message by President George Meany AFL-CIO’”, (BOX 9, AFL-CIO Archives of the
Tamiment Library & Robert F. Wagner Archives PE 201, Bobst Library, New York University,
New York City, March 19, 2015.)
4
5
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members, will lose their seats to conservatives and reactionaries in 1966. This, they write, is the
“normal” result in non-Presidential years…We cannot afford to be complacent, trusting in our
conviction that most Americans support the cause of social and economic progress.”

In the

following half a century, Meany’s “conservatives and reactionaries” attacked those legislative
achievements continuing the attack on New Deal policies.
The theories of Bourdieu, Foucault and Habermas contextualize the problems of this specific
period in the light of prior American labor history. According to Foucault, “The first thing to
check is what I should call the ‘conceptual needs.’ I mean that the conceptualization should not
be founded on a theory of the object—the conceptualized object is not the single criterion of a
good conceptualization. We have to know the historical conditions that motivate our
conceptualization. We need a historical awareness of our present circumstance. The second
thing to check is the reality with which we are dealing.”6 The thesis considers the period 19551965 as a point of disruption in the history of the labor movement and to see within that period
the seeds of future decline.
Bourdieu defined “Heretical subversion” as exploiting the possibility of changing the social
world by changing the representation of this world which contributes to its reality, or more
precisely, by counterposing a paradoxical pre-vision, a utopia, a project or programme, to the
ordinary vision which apprehends the social world as a natural world.”7 During the period 19551965 the AFL-CIO struggled with the definition of worker as automation increasingly reduced
industrial capital’s dependence on the physical bodies of workers. It battled about language, the
meaning of work, the meaning of democracy, and ultimately the meaning of the founding myth
of American society, individual freedom for as Bourdieu points out, “All linguistic practices are
6
7
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Foucault, Essential Works, 327.
Bourdieu, Language, 128.

measured against the legitimate practices, i.e. the practices of those who are dominant.” 8 Marx
foresaw that unions could also become a special-interest group although he most likely would
not have termed it so. In the Poverty of Philosophy he proposed that one can date the birth of a
social group from the moment the members of its representative organizations do not struggle
merely for the defence of the economic interests of their supporters and members but for the
defence and development of the organization itself . . . This means that by a strange irony the
concentration of political capital is at its greatest—in the absence of a deliberate (and
improbable) intervention against this trend—in parties whose aim is to struggle against the
concentration of economic capital.” 9 As the AFL-CIO solidified its position in the collective
bargaining process, it gained political capital, but lost social capital, as members it as a provider
of benefits, and non-members, the mass of American workers, resented the unattainable gains of
unionized workers.

Bourdieu pointed out, “The more advanced the process of

institutionalization of political capital is, the more the winning of ‘hearts and minds’ tends to
become subordinated to the winning of jobs.”10 But the “winning of jobs”, which focused on
the immediate needs of workers, distracted from the broader philosophical problem of where the
workers stood in the myth of American “individual freedom.”
“The great Question which in all Ages has disturbed Mankind, and brought on them the
greatest part of those Mischiefs which have ruin'd Cities, depopulated Countries, and disordered
the Peace of the World, has been, Not whether there be Power in the World, nor whence it came,
but who should have it.”11 As John Locke acknowledged in 1689, the question of power is an

Bourdieu, Language, 53.
Bourdieu, Language, 174.
10 Bourdieu, Language, 197.
11 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government: (an Essay Con- .. (IBooks, 2016), 101.
8
9
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old one. His Second Treatise of Government disputed the monarchy’s patriarchy, and in its
place posited the role of individual freedom, a freedom represented by property, both internal
and external. With Locke’s philosophical underpinnings the founders of the American republic
justified independence with lasting philosophical implications for democracy and capitalism in
the United States. In 1955 Louis Hartz called Locke the continuing philosophical presence in the
United states: “Locke dominates American political thought, as no thinker anywhere dominates
the political thought of a nation.”12 He called Locke’s “atomistic social freedom” the master
assumption of American political thought, and that a government could only control the
individual by “uniting him with a capitalist movement.”13 This master assumption lay at the
heart of power conflicts in the American labor movement 1955-1965 as the foundation myth of
individual freedom conflicted with the AFL-CIO’s reliance on collective bargaining.
In 1959 the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, held its third annual Conference
in Philadelphia. The theme was “Collective Bargaining Today.” Walter Reuther, a vicepresident of the AFL-CIO and head of its Industrial Union Department, spoke, “ We have been
trying to get people to understand that collective bargaining is a democratic tool with which free
labor and free management must work together in finding answers to common problems; that
collective bargaining transcends the quest of competing equity between the worker and
stockholder and consumer. It gets to the very core of the basic unsolved problem in the
American economy, namely, how do we work out these competing and relative equities between

12

Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 62.
13 Hartz, Liberal Tradition, 108.
6

the basic economic groups in our free society?”14 Key words in this speech, “democratic tool”,
the equivalence of “free labor” and “free management”, “common problems”, “equity” summed
up the ideological essence of American unionism. In the anti-Communist fervor of the Cold War
the AFL-CIO pledged portrayed itself as totally committed to the equivalence between
capitalism and democracy. “Collective bargaining” was not a seizure of property by the workers,
but rather perfectly in keeping with the long history of liberalism as identified with Locke. But
by its reliance on collective bargaining and by pledging support of the ruling ideology, unions
boxed themselves into a linguistic trap. Because they were working within the basic theory of
liberalism, they could only discuss themselves within that framework and there was a battle
going on as to the nature of that liberalism.
The starting point of any societal dialectic in capitalist society is the acceptance that money
informs the habitus. Poverty creates its own habitus of day-to-day need and the immediacy of
desire, how to put off until tomorrow the need for food and shelter today. Individual freedom
was the creation myth of American society, not myth in the sense that was false, but myth in the
sense that it formed the foundation of a secular society that, as much as it honored religion,
lacked the social unity of more homogeneous cultures. The Constitution enshrined the late
eighteenth century apotheosis of individual freedom and its most physical expression, property.
Thus enshrinement of property was the club that would beat back temporary gains won by
collective action. Ultimately, when one had only one’s body to offer, the competition from
innumerable other bodies was a losing proposition. The paradox of individual freedom in the

Walter Reuther, Speech, “Collective Bargaining Today”: Proceedings of the Third Annual
Industrial Relations Conference of the IUD AFL-CIO June 15 and 16, 1959 Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (BOX 6, AFL-CIO Archives of the Tamiment Library & Robert F. Wagner
Archives PE 201, Bobst Library, New York University. New York City. March 20, 2015).
14
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United States was that since it revolved around property, it neither valued the individual nor
freedom. And another great myth of the American polity was its apotheosis of the “middle class”
and the vague notion of “working class.” Bourdieu encapsulated the uses of language in
domination of the lower classes, “This nostalgic yearning for the protodoxa is expressed with
utter naivety in the admiration that all conservatisms display for ‘decent people’ ( most often
personified by the), whose essential property is designated clearly by the euphemisms (‘simple
folk’, ‘working people’) which feature in orthodox discourse: their submission to the established
order.“15 Inevitably, capitalism drew resources into fewer and fewer hands. As Chesterton noted,
“Too much capitalism does not mean too many capitalists, but too few capitalists; and so
aristocracy sins not in planting a family tree, but in not planting a family forest.”16
Bourdieu illustrated the difficulty in discussing issues surrounding the working class, “the
indeterminately extensive notion of ‘working-class areas’ owes its mystifying virtues, in the
sphere of scholarly production, to the fact that, as in a psychological projection, everyone can
unconsciously manipulate its extension in order to adjust it to their interest, prejudices or social
fantasies.”17 To rephrase Martin Luther we live in a world of justification through money alone.
Bourdieu points out, “The propensity to reduce the search for causes to a search for
responsibilities makes it impossible to see that intimidation, a symbolic violence which is not
aware of what it is (to the extent that it implies no act of intimidation) can only be exerted on a
person predisposed (in his habitus) to feel it, whereas others will ignore it.“18 The habitus of the
workers led them to believe that that the demands of capital were legitimate because money was

Bourdieu, Language, 132.
G.K. Chesterton, “Divorce”, In The G. K. Chesterton Collection (50 Books), Kindle ed.
(Catholic Way Publishing, 2012), 20940.
17 Bourdieu, Language, 91.
18 Bourdieu, Language, 51.
15
16
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the symbol of power. Demanding a role in their working lives crossed the entrenched linguistic
line of justification by money alone.
The Tamiment Archives illustrate Bourdieu’s dictum that “Every speech act and, more
generally, every action, is a conjuncture, an encounter between independent causal series.” 19
Examination of these speech acts explores the conjuncture of these independent causal series,
and explores the domination of capital over the union movement in that the movement could
only use the mode of thinking of the dominant.
A theory effect imposes a reductionist theory of class in the struggle. As Bourdieu explains,
“The pre-vision or theory effect (understood as the effect of imposition of the principles of division which occurs whenever an attempt is made to make something explicit) operates in the
margin of uncertainty resulting from the discontinuity between the silent and self-evident truths
of the ethos and the public expressions of the logos: thanks to the allodoxia made possible by the
distance between the order of practice and the order of discourse, the same dispositions may be
recognized in very different, sometimes opposing stances . . . the fact remains that is only after
Marx, and indeed only after the creation of parties capable of imposing (on a large scale) a vision
of the social world organized according to the theory of class struggle, that one could refer,
strictly speaking, to classes and class struggle . . .paradoxically, Marxist theory, which has
exercised a theory effect unrivalled in history, devotes no space to the theory effect in its theory
of history and of class.”20 This was especially true in the period after the Korean War as the
manufacturing interests reinforced their symbolic capital that they had achieved in WWII. In
wars that had pitted “democracy” against totalitarian regimes, the very term itself became a form

19
20

9

Bourdieu, Language, 38.
Bourdieu, Language, 132.

of symbolic domination as the communicative function of language disappeared in the public
discourse between labor and management.
American democracy created the great theory effect in that it imposed its authorized way of
seeing the social world, and the great project was to construct that reality; however, that reality
could only be achieved in the context of capitalism, the great theory that overrode the populist
possibilities of democracy. By controlling the use of language the capital interests fulfilled
Bourdieu’s observation that “One should never forget that language, by virtue of the infinite
generative but also originative capacity in the Kantian sense—which it derives from its power to
produce existence by producing the collectively recognized, and thus realized, representation of
existence, is no doubt the principal support of the dream of absolute power.”21
The AFL-CIO had no other option given its decrease in symbolic power after the wars than
to engage in the game of language for in Bourdieu’s terms, “the struggle tends constantly to
produce and reproduce the game and its stakes by reproducing, primarily in those who are
directly involved, but not in them alone, the practical commitment to the value of the game and
its stakes which defines the recognition of legitimacy . . . The game is over when people start
wondering if the cake is worth the candle.”22 Ultimately the struggle in the years 1955-1965 was
one of language, a battle of hearts and minds about the meaning of individual freedom and in a
sense, what the recent wars had meant for American democracy. On one hand for the moneyed
interest of the country, the victory represented individual freedom as represented in the capitalist
system in which every citizen could rely on personal talent and resolve to achieve goals
unfettered by government or the group think of unions; whereas for the unions the gains made
during the war represented both the triumph and personification of individual freedom as
21
22

Bourdieu, Language, 42.
Bourdieu, Language, 58.
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workers united for the common goal of defeating the enemy and sharing in the productivity gains
of industrialization. The industrial complex emerged from the war with not only the symbolic
capital of having saved the world against fascism and communism, but also as wielders of the
ultimate symbolic power in American society, money. Having considered itself an equal partner
in World War II, but relegated during the Korean War, the AFL-CIO concentrated on “collective
bargaining,” which led to its isolation. After the war, business controlled the legitimate
competence so that labor agreed to collective bargaining in each industry, rather than a broader
social agenda that seemed impossible to achieve politically.
Unions were at a disadvantage because business controlled the linguistics norm as the
dominant speaker in the interaction. As Bourdieu pointed out, the higher degree of formality, in
this case, collective bargaining as recognized by the Wagner Act, the more rigorous the
domination by capital. “Everything happens as if, in each particular situation, the linguistics
norm (the law of price formation) is imposed by the holder of the competence which is closest to
the legitimate competence, i.e. by the dominant speaker in the interaction, and in a way that is all
the more rigorous when the exchange has a higher degree of formality (in public, in a formal
setting, etc.)”23 Aside from the day to day problems that unions posed for management, the
nature of unions posed a philosophical threat to the underpinnings of Capital. As Chesterton
pointed out, “Capitalism believes in collectivism for itself and individualism for its enemies. It
desires its victims to be individuals, or (in other words) to be any bond, if there be any
brotherhood, if there be any class loyalty or domestic discipline, by which the poor can help the

23

Bourdieu, Language, 77.
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poor, these emancipators will certainly strive to loosen that bond or lift that discipline in the most
liberal fashion.” 24
According to Foucault “the political and economic conditions of existence are not a veil or an
obstacle for the subject of knowledge but the means by which subjects of knowledge are formed,
and hence are truth relations.”25 The AFL-CIO was a part of that struggle to form subjects of
knowledge because unions were at the center of economic and intellectual struggle. During the
period 1955-1965 the unions achieved some economic success but did not succeed in conveying
the intellectual message of their utilitarian liberalism as viable alternatives to the spread of
consumerism and anti-communism.
Bourdieu explained the problem, “Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the
categories which make it possible, are the stakes par excellence of the political struggle, a
struggle which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or
transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that
world.”26 At the very heart of the union movement lay an epistemological problem produced by
the lack of acceptable language to explain the unions’ position to American worker, and
ironically, the unions helped codify the workers as a dominated group. As Bourdieu noted “the
dominated exist only if they mobilize or avail themselves of instruments of representations.“27 In
the post Civil War period, unions created the notion of a dominated group in order to give
workers the instruments of representation. Unions created a “theory effect” in how we think of
American capitalism.

Unfortunately, unions also had an “organization effect”, which Bourdieu

described as “a sort of historical realization of what is described by the theoretical model of the
Chesterton, “Divorce”, 21050.
Foucault, Essential Works, 15.
26 Bourdieu, Language, 236.
27 Bourdieu, Language, 194.
24
25
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process of delegation. People are there and speak. Then comes the official and people speak
less often. And then there is an organization, which starts to develop a specific competence, a
language of its own.”28 The problem for the unions was that their language had boundaries,
produced by over 150 years of American trumpeting of “individual freedom” dating from before
the American Revolution, becoming an article of faith in the development of American culture.
The unions struggled to determine knowledge, power in Foucault terms, but a long accumulation
of philosophical thought lay against them. Michael Zuckert described Locke’s reformulation of
natural law as part of the history of Protestant reemphasis on the power of God as finding
“familiar and receptive response” in the white, Protestant population of the United States.”29
Zuckert described the logic of Locke’s individual freedom, “the foundation or ground of rights is
according to Locke, self-ownership. Notice that Locke here claimed to achieve the allegedly
impossible—the derivation of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ He concluded from an ‘is’ (the fact of
self-ownership) the ‘ought’ of moral inviolability. . . So, to have property is to have moral
inviolability.”30
According to Foucault “behind all knowledge (savoir), behind all attainment of knowledge
(connaissance), what is involved is a struggle for power. Political power is not absent from
knowledge, it is woven together with it.”31 Power in the period 1955-1965 could only be
discussed in terms dictated by the dominant business group, a group with the power of American
history behind it. The unions and business were involved in a chess match, but as Bourdieu
points out, “If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game

Bourdieu, Language, 218.
Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2002), 190.
30 Zuckert, Launching Liberalism, 194.
31 Foucault, Essential Works, 32.
28
29
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of chess. . . A political intention can be constituted only in one’s relation to a given state of the
political game and, more precisely of the universe of the techniques of action and expression it
offers at any given moment. . . The market of politics is doubtless one of the least free markets
that exist . . . . the political field in fact produces the effect of censorship by limiting the universe
of political discourse, and thereby the universe of what I politically thinkable, to the finite space
of discourses capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of the political
problematic, understood as a space of stances effectively adopted within the field—i.e., stances
that are socio-logically possible given the laws that determine entry into the field.”32 Many
unionized workers failed to see that their rising purchasing power was a direct result of their
union being able to wrest some of the benefits of automation for the dwindling number of
workers. The propertied class had always controlled the discourse in American history. Even
before the Civil War, slavery represented the ultimate logic of the capitalist system, treating
persons as things.
The unions exercised a form of self-censorship in that they could only produce discourse
within the framework of the anti-communism frenzy in the period after the World War II and
Korean wars. As Bourdieu pointed out, “The metaphor of censorship should not mislead: it is
the structure of the field itself which governs expression by governing both access to expression
and the form of expression, and not some legal proceeding which has been specially adapted to
designate and repress the transgression of a kind of linguistic code.”33 The unions constantly
censored themselves in painting themselves as equal partners in American capitalism, thus by
extension, legitimizing the control of the country by the business community.

32
33

Bourdieu, Language, 171.
Bourdieu, Language, 135.

14

Foucault explored the conflicts in human society, the need to examine the ways in which
power flows through society, and not to assume the justification for subjection. Foucault warned
that “everything is dangerous”, and “if everything is dangerous, then we always have something
to do”34 Unions in the period 1955-1965 helped crystallize the power structures in post-war
America. However, power in this period flowed in many rivulets.
The period 1955-1965 in a sense was a cold war of words between labor and business. Gone
were the hand-to-hand physical battles of the Great Railway Strikes of 1877, the Haymarket riots
of 1888, the Homestead strikes, and the physical battles of the 1930s. Instead there was a war of
words and the AFL-CIO found itself at a disadvantage because the rules of the game were in the
hands of business, elaborating the concept of individual freedom upon which the Republic was
founded.
Foucault examined specific historical periods to examine the resistance in a power
relationship and to see in that struggle and strategy the underlying assumptions of society at that
time in order to challenge the assumptions that linger on to the present day. This paper will
specifically look at the public statements of the AFL-CIO as collected in the Tamiment Library
at NYU, and examine the discourse of their resistance to the power of American business. It
will examine the discourse of the AFL-CIO from the vantage point of Foucault’s theory of power,
Bourdieu’s theory of language, and Habermas’s theory of communication. Of course, any
discussion of labor involves the template of discussion produced by Marx. According to Marx,
“communism creates the free, social individual whose rich inner being is dependent upon

34

Mark Olssen, "Chapter 14: Invoking Democracy: Foucault's Conception (With Insights from
Hobbes)," Counterpoints 292, no. Why Foucault? New Directions in Educational Research
(January 01, 2007): 218
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conditions of social equality where the freedom of each requires the freedom of all.”35 This idea
of the social individual can be tied in with material from the Tamiment archives of the AFL-CIO.
In the light of Foucault’s type of analysis, the main point of Marx is to try to explain something
new in the history of human interaction. Capitalism as a source of modernity was relatively new
at the time of Marx so it is important to remember that his theories were not tablets from the
mountaintop, but the beginning of a philosophical inquiry, and a step away from Kant’s reliance
on reason and the Enlightenment. Comparing and contrasting, Steven Best laid out the ways in
which Marx, Foucault, and Habermas dealt with history in the post-Enlightenment era. Marx
believed while communism represented the next stage of history, it did not create itself; rather,
Marx believed that communism required “a conscious and practical act of appropriation.”36
Foucault also used “critical theory” to illuminate the situation of the present. Like Marx,
Foucault employed historical analysis in an effort to defetishize and denaturalize the present, to
underline the discontinuities between the present and the past. Foucault maintained that to
criticize is to specify ‘how the present is absolutely different from all that it is not, that is to say,
from our past.’”37 Habermas also examines history, but to see the process of communication as
the essence of the human experience and that consensus through communication is a driver of
history. According to Best, “in many ways, Habermas advanced beyond Marx and Foucault. He
undertook an important defense of the Enlightenment that avoided Marx’s uncritical acceptance
of key tenets and Foucault’s totalizing rejection of rationality.”38
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The term “labor” is an imposition of a theory effect upon the present way of life in the
modern world in which work has become disassociated from the spiritual life of humanity and
transformed into a commodity. As Foucault explained, ”labor is absolutely not man’s concrete
essence or man’s existence in its concrete form. In order for men to brought into labor, tied to
labor, an operation is necessary, or a complex series or operations, by which men are
effectively—not analytically but synthetically—bound to the production apparatus for which
they labor. It takes this operation, or this synthesis effected by a political power, for man’s
essence to appear as being labor.39 Political power has accomplished this transformation by the
imposition of discipline upon the ordinary citizen. Centralized national authority first imposed
duties upon the individual, which advanced the capitalist system in a mutually advantageous
relationship.

An aggregated improvement in the standard of living supported the claims of

superiority for the capitalist system, while the central authority consolidated its hold on
democracy by taking credit for the improvement, and at the same time depending upon the
wealth of the capitalist system to maintain its hold.

But this story of the transformation of

American life is complex due to the benefits derived from the capitalist system. As Foucault
pointed out, “If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no,
do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power’s hold good, what
makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it
also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.”40
The history of the United States has demonstrated the triumph of this productive network of
power as the principle of individual freedom has allowed individuals to feel a part of this
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network, to engage in the discourse of democracy, while at the same time provide their labor in
the service of an overarching idea.
In the decade 1955-1965 labor saw itself as an important part of the discourse on social issues,
but in attempting to place itself as a vital upholder of democracy, labor argued on its opponents
terms. This decade is a fragment of history and to use Foucault’s means of analysis to study this
period is to see history as the particular instance of the way power works, as the rules of the
construction of truth create power, as those rules are a site of struggle, and those struggles have
their own effects for truth. The AFL-CIO struggled to redefine individual freedom in American
history.
Foucault wrote, “My role—and that is too emphatic a word—is to show people that they are
much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been
built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and
destroyed. To change something in the minds of people—that’s the role of an intellectual.”41
This thesis will look at the core truth of American history, that individual freedom was the
foundation for its democracy and that by extension, capitalism was the freest expression of that
freedom. The thesis will look at the archives of the AFL-CIO between 1955-1965 as found in
the Tamiment library to explore how the unions during that period tried to accommodate
themselves to that truth.
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Chapter 2: Labor between the Civil War and New Deal, “The Ironic Silences of Heaven”
Gilbert K. Chesterton wrote in 1922 that the truth about “Trusts and Trade Combines and the
concentration of capital” is that “they endure under one of the ironic silences of heaven, over the
pageants and the passing triumphs of hell.”42 His observation was just one of many attacks on
the injustices of unfettered American capitalism. In 1888 Edward Bellamy wrote Looking
Backward in which its protagonist visited a socialist utopia of the future, and is told, “We
belong to a future of which you could not form an idea, a generation of which you knew nothing
until you saw us.” He replied, “I had not thought of it in that way. There is much in what you
say. One can look back a thousand years easier than forward fifty.”43 In 1955 the AFL-CIO
could look back on a long history of struggle to give the American worker a share in industrial
capitalism. The AFL-CIO could not create a utopia of the workers for the same reason that
Looking Backward failed to create a utopia in the real world. Like the discourse of the AFL-CIO,
Bellamy’s utopia assumed the basic premise of American capitalism, that industrialization
provided a higher standard of living for all. Writing in 1955, Louis Hartz noted with regard to
Bellamy, “Could there be any sweeter release for the tormented trustbuster than to dream of a
perfect trust, a trust so big that it absorbed all other trusts, so big that the single act of its
nationalization collectivized all America”44
By the time of Bellamy’s book, changes accelerated by the Civil War had transformed the
raw materials of America into commodities.45 Increased industrialization caused an increased
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number of wage earners who depended upon the new organization of society. Organized labor
rose to counteract this dependence and the powerlessness of individuals in the changing
workplace. J.A. Dacus, no friend of labor, described the Railroad Strike of 1877 in his
contemporaneous account, Annals of the Great Strike in the United States, “The conviction was
universal that the four trunk railways from the seaboard to the West that the railroads had
seriously crippled themselves by carrying on a cut-throat war against each other in regard to the
rates of freights and fares, especially the former, and that this was the chief immediate reason
why they found themselves obliged to diminish the wages of employees down to the mere living
point, if not below it. The sudden reduction of the wages of the railway employees, combined
with the fact that even at the new rates, they could only get work part of the time, fell heavily
upon a vast number of honest, hardworking men; but even this was no ground for riots or
violence of any kind, which always aggravate the evils they are designed to cure.”46 Despite the
admission that wages had fallen below a subsistence level, Dacus refused to allow that the
laboring person had a right to resort to physical means to address wrongs, the only means
available to the workers, given the power of money in American society. During the Great
Railway Strike the government solidified its power by aligning with business and calling out the
militias to fight the strikers. The crisis gave opportunity for the government to mend the rift of
the Civil War, part of the process of restoring political power to the South in the Compromise of
1877, which allowed for the Election of Republican Rutherford Hayes on the promise of
removing Federal troops. Dacus pointed out, ‘This complete restoration of good feeling
between the North and South, was well illustrated in Louisville, KY during the strikes . . .
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Hundreds of ex-soldiers of the blue and grey stood shoulder to shoulder in the ranks.”47 Dacus
dismissed angry laboring people as troublemakers, “The communists and the vicious of all
classes and trades were sufficiently numerous to create no little trouble. It was well to be
prepared to act with promptness and celerity, and make quick, sharp work with public
offenders.“48 The controlling discourse associated the workers with immigrants, a depiction
meant to reinforce the American myth that the individual had no need of collective action
although the discourse failed to see the irony in the creation of armories after 1877 in cities like
New York to bring collective action against civic unrest.49 Labor unrest continued with the
original May Day on May 1, 1886 when half a million staged a strike and in the next seven years
local governments used the National Guard to deal with worker unrest.50
The dominant discourse had reason to demonize socialism as un-American. The
American Federation of Labor had a sizable socialist minority among its trade-union members
until at least WWI, and in 1893 it circulated a political program that included the collective
ownership of the major means of production.51 Samuel Gompers, first president of the AFL
steered the organization to embrace the myth of individual freedom, arguing that the union
movement should avoid involvement with both government and socialism. He developed his
position on the government’s role during the last decade of the 19th century, and he maintained it
consistently throughout the progressive era. As he stated in 1898,” our movement stands for the
wage earners doing for themselves, working out their own salvation. But those things that they
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cannot do for themselves the government should do.”52 Gompers expected the government to
provide a level playing field for workers. His Lockean principles fit into the ideal of the
individual worker having a “property” in his labor, which could not be violated by the employer
or the government. Skilled workers found common ground in this type of property, thus
eliminating a need for the philosophical theories of socialism and communism. This element of
a property in the skill of workers created tension in the 1930s as the traditional skill unions of the
American Federation of Labor conflicted with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, which
united both skilled and unskilled workers under the banner of one industry.
Despite Gompers’s endorsement of individual freedom, this “working out their own salvation”
proved difficult when business held the reins of government. Democratic presidential candidate
William Jennings Bryan built his campaign on the slogan “Shall the people rule”, demanding an
income tax and direct election of Senators. These issues might have attracted broad working
class support, but Bryan accommodated Gompers’s agenda and focused on injunctions when
courting workers’ votes. Republicans used individual freedom to make political capital of
Gompers’s small turn to the Democratic Party. They charged that AFL leaders sought to
“deliver the labor vote” to the Democrats, that they were, in other words, dictating to workers
how they should vote. 53
Even though Gompers advocated “voluntarism”, self-reliance on strikes and boycotts rather
than a radical philosophy, the Democratic Party became a natural ally given the business control
of the Republican Party. In the Wilson administration, the Adamson Act established an eighthour day for interstate railroad workers. A pattern developed that the Democratic Party would
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aggregate the interests of northern workers while at the same time ignoring non-white workers to
placate the political views of southern Democrats who held a stranglehold on political power due
to the disenfranchisement of black voters, loyal to the party of Lincoln.54
Wars offer opportunity for the dominant group to consolidate power. In the aftermath of the
WWI, Republicans in alliance with business diminished the strength of the American Federation
of Labor. By the time the Roosevelt administration came to power, the labor movement had
disintegrated, with union membership falling to 5% of the workforce. The AFL had more than 4
million members in 1919 but fewer than 2 million in 1933. Companies in the 1920s had set out
to break the unions. As joblessness mounted, the remaining workers faced falling wages and
lengthened work hours. Union leaders had to fight the insurmountable combination of
implacable employers, a receding economy, and hostile courts.55 Even though Gompers’
campaign efforts as early as 1906 had anticipated ensuing developments, the 1930s were a
turning point in labor history because they marked an increase in the rate and magnitude of the
unions’ entry into national politics.56 The experience of the depression had thrown the variations
in the term “liberalism” into relief, whether a strict Lockean interpretation of individual freedom
would prevail or a more utilitarian Benthamite version. The New Deal under Roosevelt was the
ultimate utilitarian experiment as it tried several means to bring capitalism back from the brink
of disaster. Presidential election voting increased more than 50% between 1924 and 1936 versus
a population increase of 18%. The New Deal aggregated a new coalition. According to Kevin
Boyle, the New Deal offered economic benefits to the mass of ethnic voters without cultural
preconditions. The New Deal suggested a “much bigger American house with rooms for all,
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regardless of religion or birthplace or accent, and maybe even color.”57 A temporary myth arose
that allowed for unions to appear to be part of the American democracy, and by extension,
democracy. That myth served the nation well in the wars, but it was a myth to which the ruling
group never ascribed, and to which the AFL-CIO would cling during the period 1955-1965, but
which became increasingly hollow as capital gained the upper hand.
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Chapter 3: The New Deal, “A Place at the Table”
The signal achievement of the New Deal in promoting the rise of unions had within it the
kernel of capitalist philosophy. The New Deal saw the unions as a partner in a utilitarian
approach to reversing the Depression by increasing consumer demand. The National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933 guaranteed workers the right to form and join unions. Section 7(a) of the
act stated that “employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing”, banning “yellow-dog” contracts that forbade union
membership. Under section 7(a) of the NIRA every industrial code recognized the employees’
right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to choose their own representatives without
management interference. Even though these provisions were not vigorously enforced, they
enabled union leaders to claim that President Roosevelt had personally endorsed unionism. By
1934 the AFL membership increased to over 4 million from less than 3 million in 1933, with
industrial unions making the greatest gains.58
In 1936 John Maynard Keynes would publish his General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money, which would theorize the utilitarian approach of the New Deal. Keynes attacked the
premise of classical economics, that when there’s a recession, employers lower wages. If they
lower wages, they hire more workers: therefore, the market would bring an automatic end to
every slump or recession. Keynes pointed out that lower wages lower demand. With lower
demand, employers would not hire more workers thus worsening recession.
The NIRA provided no mechanism for enforcement, and was declared unconstitutional in
1935. Later that year Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, which
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established the National Labor Relations Board and spelled out labor’s right to organize and
bargain collectively. In only 10 years, the Wagner Act led directly to an increase in union
representation from approximately 1 worker in 10 in 1934 (the year before the passage of the act)
to more than three out of 10 in 1945, and strong unions forced corporations to raise wages
roughly the same rate that the economy expanded.59 In manufacturing, between 1930 and 1940,
the proportion of workers in unions rose from 9 to 34 percent; in mining from 21 to 72 percent.
By 1948, overall union membership reached 14.1 million. The proportion of the non-farm labor
force in unions reached 25 percent by 1940, and topped 30 percent a decade later.60 The benefits
of war employment and New Deal policy had economic benefits that spread broadly through
American society. By 1945 the family income of the bottom 2/5 of Americans increased by over
60% more than double the rate of the rest of the population.61
But without a unified philosophical structure, the American Federation of Labor fissured
under the conflicting demands of workers in major industries. The American Federation of Labor
had traditionally relied on the common interests of skilled workers within the same trade. John
Lewis, president of the mineworkers, organized the Committee of Industrial Organizations
within the AFL to meet the demands of workers within an industry, many of whom lacked
specific skills. In 1938 the tensions between the two strategies would lead Lewis to form a rival
organization, renamed the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Absent a parliamentary system in which a minority labor party might use its leverage to
influence policy, the American system negated worker power. The American two-party system,
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gathered disparate groups to form coalitions to gain political power. In the quest to make
coalitions, the AFL and the CIO lacked the coherent philosophical underpinnings provided to
capitalism by John Locke. According to J. David Greenstone, despite their militancy in tradeunion matters, the CIO leaders of the 1930s had no coherent intellectual system that could have
stabilized and radicalized their demands for reform. They were a group of “workaday unions, not
a labor movement built on theory.”62 As practical men, CIO leaders were powerfully attracted to
the New Deal’s moderate social reforms, to the governmentally sanctioned security for the
unions that the Wagner Act promised, and finally to the status as valued allies of the dominant
political party.
The unions in the period also faced the problem at the heart of the American consumerist
society. The capitalist economy made the prospects of a more ideological class-based politics
more difficult. Capitalism created variations in the economic prospects of different regions,
industries, occupations and individuals.63 The portentous problem for unions was the perception
among non-unionized workers that they were losing economically and that unions only cared for
their own members.
But as much as a success in practical terms as the New Deal may have been in utilitarian
terms, it ran counter to the underlying basis of American polity. In an article in The Saturday
Evening Post “The Challenge to Liberty,” former president Herbert Hoover bemoaned how the
United States had joined a process in which “peoples and governments are blindly wounding,
even destroying, those fundamental human liberties which have been the foundation and the
inspiration of Progress since the Middle Ages.” Lamenting the “vast centralization of power in
the executive,” he excoriated the New Deal for its “economic regimentation” and what he
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viewed as its coercive “code restrictions on business.” All told, he concluded, New Deal activism,
characterized as “the daily dictation by Government, in every town and village every day in the
week, of how men are to conduct their daily lives.” Referencing the long history of individual
freedom as represented by Locke in American history, he called the New Deal “the most
stupendous invasion of the whole spirit of liberty that the nation has witnessed since the days of
Colonial America.”64
Despite the underlying philosophical opposition, by 1940 unions had won acceptance.
Business needed uninterrupted production as war orders from Europe mounted. Government
policies put corporations on the defensive, and in 1941 the entry of the United States into the war
created a need for national unity.65
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Chapter 4: World War II and the Korean War, “What is to be Done”
As happened after World War I and the Civil War, business emerged in a strong position
after World War II and the Korean War. One might also point to the Revolutionary War as the
very beginning of the propertied class asserting its privileges. A major discourse battle took
place during WWII as the Advertising Council originated in response to the shocks produced
within the advertising industry by the Great Depression, the rise of the New Deal. The approach
of war had seemed especially threatening. Conversion to wartime production would eliminate
many consumer durables and with them the need for large advertising budgets; while the
government, through defense contracts and tax rulings, might disallow advertising as a business
expense altogether.66 The Advertising Council became a propaganda arm of business to win the
war of ideas so that the idea of democracy for which ostensibly so many working class men were
fighting and for which the women at home were sacrificing would not be taken so seriously as to
mean that ordinary citizens had a voice in the running of business in which their very lives were
at stake. According to Robert Griffith, “advertising would safeguard the economy against the
possibility that an undisciplined special interest (e.g., labor) would insist too much or that the
American people, not understanding the economic system and possessed of ‘an emotional
hostility toward business, ‘ would demand public policies which might impair the system
itself.’67 After the war the advertising industry served the purposes of business as part of a
general lobbying and anti-communist scare approach, negating the wartime warnings and
promises of Roosevelt. Facing labor unrest and growing impatience with the rationing of sugar,
coffee, and tires, rising prices, pervasive shortages, overcrowded housing, and long work hours,
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Roosevelt had appealed for national unity by attacking advantages being taken by “pests who
swarm through the lobbies of the Congress and the cocktail bars of Washington . . . to make
profits for themselves at the expense of their neighbors,” and, most notably, by pledging a
postwar “Second Bill of Rights” to guarantee work and economic security, supply health care,
provide decent housing, and enhance public education.68
Unions lost the battle of discourse in the post war years to fulfill those promises. Union
membership had grown enormously during World War II, but the accompanying layoffs that
accompanied postwar reconversion challenged the unions newly won gains. The revival of
business’s symbolic capital during the war added to the labor movement’s weakness. Bruce
Catton derided them as the ‘warlords of Washington,’ but business leaders’ new authority in
Washington enabled them to stymie the federal government’s postwar planning. The labor
movement’s internal divisions hampered the CIO’s ability to counter the corporate resurgence.
When the CIO proposed a national wage agreement to Pres. Truman’s Labor management
conference in September 1945, the AFL and independent mineworkers president John L Lewis
joined with employer representatives in rejecting the idea. The union’s subsequent massive
strikes incurred the wrath of leaders in both major political parties. The Truman administration
intervened in several strikes in 1945 and 1946, badly compromising the union positions. The
Democratic-controlled Congress overwhelmingly passed anti-labor legislation, the Case bill in
1946, although Truman vetoed the measure. Then the Republican Party took advantage of low
voter turnout to win a solid victory in the fall congressional elections. The Republican-controlled
Congress proceeded to pass the National Association of Manufactures-drafted Taft-Hartley act of
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1947.69 According to Kevin Boyle, “By polarizing the labor issue, Taft-Hartley had the effect of
catapulting labor more squarely into politics than ever before. It intensified the efforts of both
labor and industry to win over that ambiguous animal known as public opinion.”70
The political climate after World War II drove unions deeper into the arms of the Democratic
Party. CIO leaders wanted an alliance with liberal Democrats to transform the party into a
programmatic reformist party that would promote a full-employment welfare state program. For
example, a more programmatic Democratic Party, led by a sympathetic president, could take a
party-line vote to overturn the Taft-Hartley Act. In fact, union leaders thought this would be
accomplished in 1949 after the Democrats won the 1948 congressional and presidential elections.
The events of 1949 made it clear that the unions needed to commit to political action and to
position themselves as part of the political mainstream. The CIO merged with the AFL in 1955
and took the lead in the new labor federation’s Committee on Political Education. It also led
labor social Democrats to join with liberal Democrats in their commitment to civil rights and to
anti-Communist patriotism.71
Ironically, during the war the American government had become a socialist enterprise. By
war’s end, the federal government owned fully 40 percent of the country’s capital assets. The
federal budget had grown from $ 9.5 billion in 1940 $ 92 billion in 1945.72 Overall, the economy
surged and unemployment disappeared, dropping from a rate of 14.6 percent in 1940 to just 1.2
percent in 1944.73 In opposition to labor leaders like Walter Reuther who called for the
government to use its assets to produce housing and social objectives, the rhetoric of anti-
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communism reinforced opposition to any kind of collective action on the part of workers, and fed
into the American myth of individual freedom. The threat of communism became mantra for the
government and its allies in big business. Coming out of the war, the unions had no reasonable
path to motivate workers, other than bread and butter issues because the ideological ground had
been taken by business. Business returned to normal after the war and with an increased labor
supply and decreased war demand, the overtime paychecks of worker decreased. Workers
looked to unions to maintain their improved standard of living, thus cementing the role of unions
as providers of benefits. The strikes following the war only improved the ideological position of
business, which could portray the unions as just one of many interests in a pluralist society.
Ira Katznelson analyzed the political situation following WWII in terms of the racial
predilections of Southern congressmen who saw unionization as threatening white domination in
the South. After the period of Reconstruction in the South, Democrats controlled state offices,
but Republican control of the presidency and Congress had limited their ability to control
chairmanships. With the coming of the New Deal and Democratic national power, Southern
Democrats were willing to acquiesce to progressive ideas in exchange for increased government
spending in their states so long as it maintained the social status of the white electorate. With
government spending in the South, however, came union penetration, rising from 10 percent to
20 percent during the war.74 Fearing the loss of social control and the attraction of the South as
a low wage sector, the southern Democrats joined with pro-business Republicans to pass antilabor legislation, such as the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Since the AFL and the CIO had
depended upon the political process, the control of Congress by an anti-union coalition led to a
retreat from the broader goals of a united worker movement to reliance on collective bargaining
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as its contribution to democracy, when in fact, one could argue that the unions were retreating
from the democratic project as a whole, that is, ensuring a level of equality. The AFL and the
CIO focused resources on the greatest return, the large industries centered in the North while
defending themselves against charges of anti-communism.
The Korean War reinforced the threat of world anti-communism in the discourse between
business and labor, contributing to the isolation of organized labor as a special interest. During
WWII, Roosevelt’s call for a united front against the Axis powers had enshrined labor,
government and business as bastions of democracy against tyranny. Seth Widgerson analyzed
the effect of the Korean War upon American labor and determined that “The Korean War
crystalized the position of business as a bulwark against the perceived aggressiveness of
communism as seen in Korean, and business wrapped itself in the cloak of free enterprise as
defender of the American way of life against godless communism and its perceived abolishment
of individual freedom.”75 Government and business could not have ignored the fact that unions
were in a strong position to further the “class” consciousness of the workers in line with Lenin’s
Marxist thinking about the need for an elite group of leaders to educate workers on their
condition and need for unified action. As Lenin wrote in What is to be Done, “the masses will
never learn to conduct the political struggle until we help to train leaders for this struggle, both
from among the enlightened workers and from among the intellectuals.”76 Ironically, because
unions still set a pattern for wages in the early 1950s, their gains fed into the general acceptance
that capitalism went hand in hand with democracy as the superior way of life versus communism.
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The wartime consensus was fragile as the leaders of industry acceded to worker demands
given labor shortages, but at the same time used government regulations to stifle union activism.
Labor unrest after the war led a Republican majority to pass the Taft-Hartley. The solid gains of
the New Deal and WWII began to melt into air, but with a holding action of collective
bargaining.
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Chapter 5: The Decade 1955-1965, “The Cornucopia”
At midcentury, the distinguished American historian David Potter argued that America as a
“people of plenty had eluded, thanks to the cornucopia produced by its marvelous economic
machinery, what might otherwise have been bitter political and social acrimony arising out of the
abrasiveness of class inequities.”77 In the decade 1955-1965 the AFL-CIO strove to share that
“cornucopia” broadly across the American population.
Writing in the December 1967 issue of The AFL-CIO American Federationist, the union’s
official magazine, research director Nathaniel Goldfinger reflected upon the past decade in his
article “The Growth of the AFL-CIO.” “In 1955 the AFL-CIO consisted of 12,486,000
members or 19.2 percent of the civilian labor force. Membership fell to a low point in 19621963 with 17.6 percent, but surged to 18.6 percent in the first six months of 1967.
Union membership gains have been in an upsurge since 1963. . . . In 1966-1967 the average paid
membership of AFL-CIO affiliates rose to 13.8 million. By the first six months of 1967, per
capita dues payments of unions affiliate . . . were up to 14.3 million—representing 18.6 percent
of the civilian labor force. This was a gain of 1.8 million since the 1962-1963 low-point, when
the . . . paid membership represented 17.6 percent of a much smaller labor force.”78 Goldfinger
pointed to the recessions of 1958 and 1960-1961 as contributing factors to union difficulties, but
his article emphasized the political environment as the major factor in union fortunes, citing the
Eisenhower administration as hostile to labor issues.
The AFL-CIO’s alignment with the Democratic Party had paid dividends as Goldfinger
described, “ The political situation changed considerably in 1961 after the inauguration of
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JFK . . . On January 17,1962, President Kennedy issued an executive order which directed
federal agencies to recognize and bargain with unions representing their employees. While this
executive order dealt directly with federal employees, it provided an atmosphere of support for
union organization and in public employment generally—state and local government, as well as
federal.” In another article “Negroes and Jobs”, Goldfinger elaborated on the downward
pressure on union jobs, “the number of factory production and maintenance jobs dropped 1.5
million or 11 percent between 1953 and 1963. In that same period, the number of nonsupervisory employees in mining was cut 267,000 or 35 percent, employment of production and
related workers in soft coal mining alone dropped about 60 percent. And railroad employment
fell 530,000 or approximately 44 percent”, but emphasizing the economic role of government, he
added, “Between 1963 and the early months of 1966, the general economic improvement picked
up steam. The faster pace of economic growth—under the impact of the tax cut of 1964,
followed in mid-1965 by the additional impact of rising military spending as well-was
concentrated in heavy goods manufacturing, construction and related activities.”79 But despite
this pressure upon unions, the ability to pressure business to share the profits of a consumerist
society led to societal change in the post-war period for a certain portion of the working class.
Industrialization had begun the societal change of a dependence upon men to be the provider
of wages as women maintained the domestic sphere. It increased dependence upon wages, and
the formation of unions of the railroad strikes of 1877. John Hay in his anti-union novel of 1883
The Breadwinners reflected the division as wives demanded their husbands stop their strike,
“Every woman went for her husband and told him to pack up and go home . . . but the bigger part
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talked hard sense, told ‘em their lazy picnic had lasted long enough, that there was no meat in the
house, and that they had got to come home and go to work.”80

The success of the AFL-CIO

increased union wages and reinforced dependence upon one, typically male wage-earner.
Television programs of the time idealized the male role, the father working (albeit in a white
collar job, such as Ward Cleaver) and the mother at home to care for the children.
Talcott Parsons argued that this arrangement was suited to an industrial society.

Sociologist
A family could

easily follow economic opportunity as jobs migrated.81 The analysis of Mr. Parsons of course
posited the strong industrial position of the United States at this time; more attractive jobs might
open in a different part of the country, as witness the Great Migration of blacks from the South
between 1915-1960.
The arrangement was not only suited to industrial mobility, but also the rise of fertility.
The period from just after the war to the early 1960s was the only period of sustained rising
fertility in the nation’s history. Cherlin posits that one reason lay in in the unique life histories of
young adults who were in their twenties and thirties. They experienced the Great Depression as
children or adolescents and then a world war erupted as they reached young adulthood. Family
life was the domain in which they found that security. “Raising children provided a sense of
purpose to adults who had seen how fragile the social world could be.”82 But it is important to
consider the mindset of the mostly male workforce in this postwar period, which along with
union leaders saw a well-paying job as part of what the war had been about, and that democracy
and capitalism naturally went together.
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The decade 1955-1965 may have been a high point for the AFL-CIO, but the vast majority of
American workers stood outside the union movement. Private sector unionization peaked at
about 35% in the postwar era.83 Southern states had imposed “right to work” laws hampering
union organization, and had ceded management of the shop floor to management in return for
improved wages.84
The theme of the “Second Annual Industrial Relations Conference IUD, AFL-CIO”, held in
New York City in 1958 was the “Union Shop and the Public Welfare.” Walter Reuther lamented
that “We face two basic challenges in the American labor movement.

One is the job of

organizing the unorganized . . . but the most important job is the job of education, the job of
unionizing the organized, so that they carry not only a union card in their wallet, but understand
and carry unionism in their heart as well.”85 Bourdieu pointed out that “all symbolic domination
presupposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of complicity which is neither passive
submission to external constraint nor a free adherence to values.”86 Reuther could not overcome
the symbolic domination imposed by allowing collective bargaining to maintain control of the
workplace by management. Union members fell victim to the post-war mantra of consumerism,
which ensconced capitalism as the purveyor of plenty, particularly in comparison to the lack of
consumer goods in communist countries.
In this decade the AFL-CIO engaged in “hyper-correction” in attempting to share the
American values of the dominant, and to share in the language of democracy and capitalism.
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Labor, convinced of the justice of its cause, reconciled its cause with capitalism.

Like

Bourdieu’s petits bourgeois, the AFL-CIO appropriated “prematurely, at the cost of constant
tension, the properties of those who are dominant. “87 The AFL-CIO internalized the “American
Dream” and the adoption of the hegemony’s interpretation of communism. The hegemony
equated capitalism with democracy, and the American system with the achievement of a better
way of life. According to Bourdieu, “The language of authority never governs without the
collaboration of those it governs, without the help of the social mechanisms capable of producing
this complicity, based on misrecognition, which is the basis of all authority.”88
Union leaders had made the step into the political realm where power is a struggle over
words, and as such ran the hazard that any spokesperson suffers in the way in which language
works in the political arena because according to Bourdieu, “the speech of the spokesperson
owes part of its ‘illocutionary force’ to the force (the number) of the group that he helps to
produce as such by the act of symbolization or representation; it is based on the metaphorical
coup d’etat by which the speaker invests his utterance with all the power his utterance helps to
produce by mobilizing the group to which it is addressed. . . . It is because it is enough for ideas
to be professed by political leaders in order to become mobilizing ideas capable of making
themselves believed . . . that mistakes are misdeeds or, in the native language of politics,
‘betrayals.’”89 Granci called union officials “ ‘A banker of men in a monopoly system’”90 By
entering into the world of politics the unions entered into the struggle of power through
knowledge, as Foucault states, “If we truly wish to know knowledge, to know what it is, to
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apprehend it at its root, in its manufacture, we must look not to philosophers but to politicians—
we need to understand what the relations of struggle and power are.“ 91
In the United States money defined the reality. The collective notion involved in unionism
was destined to fail once immediate needs were satisfied in a crisis such as the Depression, only
to rise again in another crisis such as WWII , and then to be thrown aside again. The utopian
ideal of Looking Backward promised to end the cycle, but utopian dreams only come true for the
dominant class. The AFL-CIO answered the question of identity in terms of “individual
freedom. ” Unions thus accepted the same definition of truth as the forces they opposed. But
unions in this period disassociated themselves from the philosophical underpinnings of Marx.
According to Victor Best, Marx believed that the proletariat would break its capitalist chains
once it attained “a rational understanding of the material conditions of its oppression.”92 Marx
might have asked whether the AFL-CIO understood the “material conditions” of its oppression.
By agreeing to collective bargaining in isolated locations (as opposed to grasping control of the
narrative through national action), it masked the “material conditions” through temporary gains
in a consumerist society. The AFL-CIO contributed to the grand narrative that American
capitalism was the world’s best system because its workers enjoyed a comfortable life style even
though those gains came through union effort. The ability of business to control the field of
discourse in that capitalism proved the superior system because of the material benefits fit into
Foucault‘s theories. According to Best, Foucault “induced an important skepticism about the
achievements of liberalism and democracy by showing that behind the rhetoric of increased
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freedom lies the mechanisms of detailed control and coercion. He pointed to ways in which
‘reason’ is violence and ‘truth’ is the concealment of power.”93
The AFL-CIO worked from a minority position in the nation, and business acted to minimize
union labor by diminishing the work force through replacing high wage union jobs with
machines. The AFL-CIO acknowledged the threat to jobs, but accepted the premise that
increased productivity led to higher wages. In a 1961 pamphlet title “Automation” the AFL-CIO
looked to government to help mitigate the dangers to workers: “Even though automation is in
one sense only an extension of the industrial revolution to new frontiers, it is in many respects
more frightening to wage-earners. There are several reasons: the nature of the equipment itself,
many of the new devices impress the average person as almost superhuman; the change in skill
required of workers; automation, replaces many unskilled or semi-skilled workers with a handful
of highly-trained technicians; the change in the general job outlook, the industrial revolution took
place at a time when the United States was expanding its borders and when Americans were
moving into new, rich, virtually-unoccupied lands in the West.”94 This part of the pamphlet
assumed an acceptance of the Lockean idea that man made nature productive. The pamphlet
makes no mention of indigenous peoples who apparently were not making use of their “virtuallyunoccupied lands.”
The pamphlet goes on to invoke an almost Bellamy-type utopia of management and labor
cooperation: “To reach the Utopia that, in a technical sense, seems only a few steps away, our
society must be able to consume what it produces. That means we must somehow devise a way
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to adjust to automation; to assure full employment in an era of expanding population and manhour productivity. It is not too much to say that this is a challenge to the future of our
civilization itself.” However, that utopia was not to be reached by the “voluntarism” of
Gompers, but rather by partnership with government and business: “Organized labor insists that
rapid technological change must not be at the expense of workers and the community.
Government and business must assume their responsibilities to minimize social dislocations and
prevent distresses by providing the cushions needed during periods of change. No other course
is tolerable in a humane and democratic society.”
Faced with the inevitability of automation, productivity became part of the philosophy of
union demands. A 1956 AFL-CIO pamphlet “Wages and Prices: Let’s Keep American
Prosperous” analyzed the economy: “The problem of our American economy requires keeping
these two things in mind: America’s wage and salary earners, who are more productive at their
jobs each year, need rising incomes to buy the rising volume of goods produced by America’s
factories and farms. Without that rise in buying power America’s factories and farms will lose
their markets. Jobs will get scarce and we will find ourselves headed for recession, or worse.” 95
The pamphlet accepted the Keynesian argument of putting money into the hands of consumers to
provide the demand that would maintain and stimulate supply while appealing to the self-interest
of business. To refute the claim that higher wages promoted inflation, the pamphlet suggested
the unlikely remedy of business acting in a unified manner to control prices: “America’s basic
industries, the pace-setters, can do a far better job of absorbing all-time peaks, and the productive
efficiency of industry and labor is at a record high level. There is no reason why each wage
AFL-CIO Pamphlet, “Wages and Prices: Let’s Keep American Prosperous”, 1957,
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increase in these basic industries must be passed along in the form of greatly higher prices.”
The pamphlet implied a utopia in which all players acted for the common good without the
pressure of competition. Walter Reuther returned to this concept in the Conference on
Collective Bargaining, “What we have been trying to do at the bargaining table is basic. We
have been trying to provide a contribution to working out the kind of approach that will make it
possible to achieve a dynamic, expanding balance between greater productive power and greater
purchasing power. ‘Purchasing power’ tries to appeal to the self-interest of the capitalists, but
since the capitalists are competing against each other, they are not going to see the benefits of
increasing that power of their workers if it is going to be spent with a competitor. For the theory
to succeed would require large scale organizing so that all capitalists would be paying the higher
rates.”96
Automation was a constant theme of the decade. A panel discussion held under the auspices
of The Industrial Union Department in 1958 included an analysis by Daniel Bell, labor editor of
Fortune Magazine: “The meaning of industrialization as a peculiar modern fact arose out of the
measurement of work. It’s when work can be measured, when you can hitch a man to the job,
that you have got modern industrialization. Unless that fact is understood, it seems to me one
doesn’t understand the whole historical impact of what automation itself imposes.”97
An undated pamphlet from the late 1950s “Progress and Productivity” promoted this
supposed partnership between labor and business: “Our unions negotiate with the employer as a
partner in our free economy, not as a class enemy. We want him to prosper—so that we too, can
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prosper with ‘more . . . now!’”98 The line echoed Gomper’s reply when asked what the
workingman wanted, “more . . . now”, but by the time of this pamphlet the AFL-CIO had
become institutionalized to the detriment of the militancy of its early beginnings.
The AFL-CIO considered itself such a part of the anti-communist, pro-capitalist American
system that in his preface to “Platform Proposals to the Republican and Democratic National
Conventions 1964”, George Meany proudly stated that “the modern labor movement long ago
outgrew the role of “special interest group” in the narrow sense. The AFL-CIO is made up of
13.5 million men and women who live in every state of the Union; who are engaged in virtually
every occupation except business proprietorship; and whose interests, not only as union members
but as citizens, embrace every facet of American life.”99 The “The International Situation”
section of the proposals described the AFL-CIO as avowedly anti-communist, “The continuing
struggle between democracy and totalitarian dictatorship is the all-important feature of the
international situation. It is the basic source of the world crisis . . . communists everywhere are
bound together by an all-encompassing aim—to attain the worldwide triumph of communism
and remold the entire world on their totalitarian pattern.” This denunciation implied the need for
the capitalist system to embrace unionism as part of the anti-communist bulwark.
The unions had a history of anti-communism, but the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the
Communist Control Act of 1954 ensured that government would enforce that anticommunism.100 Business interests possessed a unifying philosophy in the post-war period, the
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Lockean “individual freedom” represented by private property, and were able to use government
regulation to restrict unions. But the AFL-CIO rejected a workable philosophical analysis,
Marxism, because it was tied to Russian communism. In an October 1966 issue of The AFLCIO American Federationist, president George Meany seemed to revel in this lack of
philosophy in his article “Labor’s Role in a Free Society”: “Let us look briefly at the nature of
the American labor movement. The one word that best describes its day-to-day operation is
“practical.” We deal with one problem or one set of problems at a time. We avoid preconceived notions and we do not try to fit our program into some theoretical, all-embracing
structure. This down-to-earth, one thing at a time approach is uniquely American. And it can
be said, I think, that the same pragmatic approach is a unique feature of the American legislative
system.”101 Unfortunately, Mr. Meany’s avoidance of “pre-conceived” notions reflected a denial
of the collective nature of unionism and overlooked the long-range strategies of the business
sector. Mr. Meany went on in that article to declare a significant role for unionism in American
history “For nearly 200 years, trade unions have contributed to the marketplace of ideas. We
believe our contributions have been greater as our movement has grown stronger. And we
believe that the life of every American, and the hopes of every child, are brighter as a result.”
Meany’s argument overlooked the important role played by the Roosevelt administration in
equalizing the playing field for unions after management gained the upper hand in the 1920s and
the Depression.
Unfortunately for Meany, anti-communist rhetoric had the distinct advantage of falling in line
with the two hundred years of American perception of liberty as individual freedom. Business
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promoted itself as heir to the traditional Lockean ideal of individual freedom; whereas, the AFLCIO portrayed itself as advancing the ideal of individual freedom by empowering the individual
versus the power of business. As Reuther saw in his needing to “unionize the organized”, the
labor movement operated on an assumption that individuals would participate as active members
of a democracy. However, as described by David Croteau, “Liberty does not necessarily require
the active engagement of citizens in political or social spheres. . . The right wants to guarantee a
person’s freedom to be left alone—a decidedly private vision.”102 According to an analysis by
Barry Hindress, personal autonomy is an ambiguous notion, “In one case the focus is on the
‘natural’ status of human autonomy, and therefore on behavior that is subject to no involuntary
constraint. In the other case the focus is on the “artefactual” status of autonomy, and therefore
on the conditions under which it may be created.”103
The conundrum for the AFL-CIO was that the individual worker had no power as an
individual. As Chesterton pointed out, in his essay “Divorce”, “Capitalism believes in
collectivism for itself and individualism for its enemies. It desires its victims to be individuals, or
(in other words) to be any bond, if there be any brotherhood, if there be any class loyalty or
domestic discipline, by which the poor can help the poor, these emancipators will certainly strive
to loosen that bond or lift that discipline in the most liberal fashion. If there be such a
brotherhood, these individualists will redistribute it in the form of individuals; or in other words
smash it to atoms.”104 However, the relative successes of the AFL-CIO prior to 1955 resulted in
an institutionalization of the inherent struggle between business and labor, which placed the
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struggle at a remove from the daily life of union members, and by focusing on a largely white,
male membership increasingly isolated that struggle from the mass of American workers. Those
non-union members were fair game for the constant drumbeat of anti-communist rhetoric from
both government and business, which portrayed the collective aspects of unionism as antithetical
to American ideals.
Croteau posited that the AFL-CIO merger in 1955 marked the symbolic end of labor unions
as broad social movements and signaled their reconstitution as special-interest groups that held a
junior partnership in the newly formed labor-management accord.105 Union rhetoric claimed its
place in democracy as a voice for the people. George Meany reflected the self-imposed
restraints as he summed up the AFL-CIO’s position in his address to the 50th anniversary World
Convocation of the National Industrial Conference in September 1966: “The New Deal
redefined the role of government as the protector of the total public interest. And it tried to
promote the welfare of all the people—workers as well as business. . . .The AFL-CIO will
continue its efforts as a free institution to advance the cause of democracy under freedom. . .
Whenever workers participate in deciding the issues that affect their working lives, a sense of
personal dignity is achieved and their regard for freedom is enhanced. . .Unions want a fair share
for workers who make their contribution to the economic system. . . We think that the American
economic system, with its potential for progress, works quite well. We see no better system
anywhere in the world today or in the history of the past.”106
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An AFL-CIO publication in 1956 “The Greater Danger: The Post-Stalin Pattern for
Communist World Conquest” categorized the errors of the 20th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union held in February of that year. The AFL-CIO equated union gains with
the democratic process, thus conflating democracy and capitalism. “The phenomenal rise in
productivity, the increased living standards of the workers, the enhanced prestige and social
status of labor, the growth of the numerical, economic and political power of trade unions, the
emergence of the welfare state—all these facts which have characterized the development of the
democracies in the last decades—were completely ignored by the 20th Congress.”107
Although the New Deal ascribed to the Keynesian theory that improving wages would create
increased demand for goods and services, the post-war period saw the pendulum swing back to
the holders of capital. In his book The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in
the Fifties Daniel Bell wrote in 1960, “Yet what the Socialists, who thought only of winning full
power, did not see, and what the capitalists, who sought to retain all power, did, was that
unionism, in a fashion, is a revolutionary force. While it does not aim at overthrowing power, it
means by curbing the arbitrary and unilateral right of an employer to hire, fire, promote, and set
the pace and conditions of work, a distinct sharing of power. And, more important it challenged
the older justifications of unilateral power which gave a moral and psychological strength and
unity to the business class.”108 Thus the Republican party under Eisenhower combined with antilabor southern Democrats to thwart the AFL-CIO agenda.
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The election of 1958 epitomized the problem of AFL-CIO alliance with the Democratic
Party. In this recession year Senate Democrats held nearly a two thirds majority, 64 to 34; in the
House they picked up 42 districts to give the party a commanding 282 seats, with Republicans
holding but 154. Walter Reuther announced, “the people chose to identify themselves with the
forces of labor. . . I personally think this is the most significant political election in terms of the
basic loyalties that taking place in American politics in many, many years.”109 Despite political
success, in the “Collective Bargaining Today” conference in 1959, Reuther would tell the
assembled delegates that, “this is the backdrop of our conference—a hardening of the attitudes, a
deterioration in the general relationship of labor and management with respect to the discharge of
their responsibilities . . . I have just emerged . . . from a year of difficulties. 1958 was the most
difficult year in the 20-odd years of our collective bargaining experience.” 110 The alliance of
southern Democrats and Republicans prevented any pro-labor agenda and the institutionalization
of collective bargaining encapsulated the AFL-CIO as just one faction to be considered in the
increasingly factionalism of post-war government.
The period 1955-1965 saw great advances in standard of living in terms of consumerist values.
The emphasis on becoming a part of the consumerist society reflected a change in the Marxist
paradigm as worker compensation could no longer be strictly defined in terms of “surplus value”
as technology increased the output of the diminishing work force, a term that came to be
considered “productivity.” However, a consumerist society led to increased demand and
increased debt. Debt increased the control of the moneyed class, a method of control over
workers, which Bellamy had warned against in 1888, “It was the misfortune of your
contemporaries that they had to cement their business fabric with a material which an accident
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might at any moment turn into an explosive. They were in the plight of a man building a house
with dynamite for mortar, for credit can be compared with nothing else.”111 Consumerism
played into the myth of individual freedom against the strands of collective good represented in
Bellamy’s call for a unified approach to the needs of all.
“Freedom Forever: Labor Rejects Communism”, an undated AFL-CIO pamphlet from the
mid-1950s, described how the union movement actually perfected capitalism, which the
pamphlet equated with democracy: “The American labor movement rejects every type of
totalitarianism because such ideologies destroy freedom. The AFL-CIO knows that the
workingman cannot prosper unless he is free. However much communists and other dictators
may claim to help wage earners, the record shows that they enslave workers. Communism is one
of the most insidious forms of enslavement. It is reactionary and barbaric. . .Communist
agitators and propagandist stir up discontent wherever real or fancied grievances exist. It is easy
for them, when enjoying the privileges of the Free World, to criticize inequalities and injustices.
It is easy for them to promise all things to all people, but only free people—such as those in free
trade unions—can actually correct evils fairly and justly.”112 This pamphlet like other literature
of the AFL-CIO attempted to follow Habermas’s five key processual requirements of discourse
ethics as summarized by Bent Flyvbjerg. First, a requirement of generality, no party affected by
what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse. Second, autonomy, all
participants should have equal possibility to present and criticize validity claims in the process of
discourse. Third, ideal role taking, participants must be willing and able to empathize with each
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other’s validity claims. Fourth, power neutrality, existing power differences between participants
must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on the creation of consensus. Fifth,
transparence, participants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection
desist from strategic action. Flyvbjerg added a sixth given the implications of Habermas’s
requirements, unlimited time.”113
Point by point, the AFL-CIO engaged in this discourse at a disadvantage. First, after WWII
government and business saw no need to enlist labor as a partner, thus negating the requirement
of generality. Second, business undermined union autonomy by its anti-communist rhetoric.
Third, although the unions portrayed themselves as essential to the capitalist system, business
worked to marginalize that “ideal role taking” by supporting the “right to work” laws in southern
and western states. Fourth, given the role of money in American culture, business emerged from
the war with a power difference, thus eliminating “power neutrality.” Fifth, since business
could cloak itself with the mantle of anti-communism and individual freedom, it was able to
cloud the “transparence” of the move to weaken union power. And finally, time ran out after
1965, in the changed social climate of the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements.
The AFL-CIO compromised their discourse by sublimating the message of worker needs to
its continued involvement with the Democratic Party. The AFL-CIO had obviously benefited
from the Roosevelt and Truman pro-labor legislation, and the Republican anti-labor legislation in
the post-war period cemented the political allegiance; however in this period the AFL-CIO
became increasingly involved in aggregating voters for the party, even on issues that were not
strictly beneficial to union workers. According to the analysis of David Greenstone, “the labor
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movement vigorously supported Medicare, reapportionment, and civil rights measures not
because they necessarily benefited the lower classes but because their beneficiaries primarily
voted Democratic or might be induced to do so.“114
Foucault wrote, “ History has no ‘meaning,’ though this is not to say that it is absurd or
incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the
smallest detail—but this in accordance with the intelligiblility of struggles, of strategies and
tactics. Neither the dialectic, as the logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of
communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. ‘Dialectic’ is a way of
evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton,
and ‘semiology’ is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody, and lethal character by reducing it to
the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue.”115 In order to analyze the period, it is
important to examine the history of the movement in order to explain the way in which the
unions thought of themselves, their goals, fears, and the internal demands put upon them by their
members and the external pressures of government and capital. The public writings of the AFLCIO in this period are not profoundly philosophical, perhaps somewhat banal, but as Foucault
points out, “since Kant, the role of philosophy is to prevent reason from going beyond the limits
of what is given in experience . . .the role of philosophy is also to keep watch over the excessive
powers of political rationality . . . What we have to do with banal facts is to discover—or try to
discover—which specific and perhaps original problem is connected with them.”116
As Foucault explains, “In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of
action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an
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action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions. A relationship of violence
acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes off
possibilities. . . . A power relationship, on the other hand, can only be articulated on the basis of
two elements that are indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship; that ‘the other’ . . . is
recognized and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that, faced with a
relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may
open up.”117 For a period of time the struggle the AFL-CIO fit not only into Foucault ‘s theory of
power because it dovetailed with the American foundation myth of “individual freedom” because
the union leaders saw themselves as free actors in a democracy, and although the owners of
capital seemed to have a free hand in their conduct of business, labor leaders could define
themselves in the struggle as free agents. As Foucault explained, “Power is exercised only over
free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free.’ By this we mean individual or collective
subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several
ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available . . . At the very heart of the power
relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of
freedom.”118 The struggle can be perceived in evolutionary terms in that the constant struggle to
survive led to changes in the philosophies of the participants. The political environment led the
AFL-CIO to adopt the discourse of the dominant class in claiming a central role in capitalism
and democracy.
At the same time as this was going on, the AFL-CIO dealt with the complexity of relations as
Americans felt racial lines much stronger than economic lines. Boyle described the structural
impediments to a purely class politics as “utterly overwhelming” as the uneven benefits of
117
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collective bargaining divided workers.119 Ideally, the AFL-CIO in this period would have borne
out Habermas’s theories of communication as unions gave voice to a segment of the population
that lacked individual means to express its goals. But even within the unions, the pluralism of
American society and the deeply entrenched bedrock of the theory of individual freedom
diminished the voice of the unions, versus the voices of capitalism, which however discordant
within the framework of competition, were united against the threat of the perceived collective
voice of unionism.
The turn to the Democratic Party meshed with Foucault ‘s theory of governmentality as the
increasing power of the federal government necessitated an acknowledgement that power
struggles, although they did not begin with the federal government, certainly were part of the
government’s perception of its pastoral role towards its citizens, in the sense that the government
controlled the welfare of its citizens. As Foucault pointed out, “The exercise of power is not a
naked fact, an institutional given, nor is it a structure that holds out or is smashed; it is something
that is elaborated, transformed, organized; it endows itself with processes that are more or less
adjusted to the situation . . . Power relations are rooted in the whole network of the social. . .
Using here the restricted meaning of the word ‘government,’ one could say that power relations
have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and
centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of state institutions.”120 Unfortunately this
meshing worked against the purpose of the unions. Labor in effect transformed itself from an
opposition social movement into virtual vassals of Democratic politicians. As Gompers would
have predicted, politicians were interested in aggregating power for the larger party.
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Given the need to emphasize democracy in the rhetoric of the time it was not totally outside
Foucault theory for the unions to act as they did.
The closing years of 1955-1965 saw the AFL-CIO working closely with the Democratic Party
to aggregate a coalition of labor, the elderly and minorities. The strategy enabled a counterstrategy by the Republican Party to take advantage of regional differences. As Gompers warned
in the early years of the American Federation of Labor, involvement with politics would lead to
compromise and opposition. The missed opportunities of the 1930s and 1940s with its
compromises with Southern Democrats over Civil Rights came back to haunt the AFL-CIO as
blacks ignored the AFL-CIO and relied on government action to further their cause. Thus, the
Civil Rights movement made the same mistake as the AFL-CIO by depending upon a political
party, narrowing themselves as a special interest.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion, “Much Unfinished Work”
On November 15, 1963 President Kennedy addressed the Fifth Constitutional Convention
of the AFL-CIO in New York City. His speech captured the symbiotic relationship of the AFLCIO and the Democratic Party: “I come here today to express my appreciation to the AFL-CIO
which is attempting in the 1960s to do what its fathers did in the 1930s in supporting a program
of progress for this country of ours. So we ask your help not next year but now. Marshal
Lyautey, the great French marshal, went out to his gardener and asked him to plant a tree. The
gardener said, ‘Why plant it? It won’t flower for 100 years.’ ‘In that case,’ the Marshal said,
‘plant it this afternoon.’ That is what we have to do.”121 President Kennedy could look back in
history, but could not predict the future, neither his tragic death the following week, nor the
decline of the organization before him. According to statistics gathered by the U.S. Department
of Labor, the percent of wage and salary workers who were members of unions fell to 10.4
percent in 2016. Public-sector unions, a legacy of President Kennedy, bolstered that figure with
34.4 percent union membership. Private sector unions organized only 6.4 percent of American
workers.122
Even with their devotion to the Democratic Party, the AFL-CIO had only a tenuous hold at a
seat at the table of power. Much depended on the Democratic Party’s priorities. In 1965, after the
democratic landslide of the previous year, Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Congressional
leadership prevailed on the AFL-CIO to slow its insistence on replacing Taft-Harley’s
John F. Kennedy, Press Release, “News from the AFL-CIO NA.8-3870 for release Monday,
November 16,1959, ‘The White House Remarks of the President to the Fifth Constitutional
Convention of the AFL-CIO’, American Hotel, New York City (as actually delivered)” (BOX 9,
AFL-CIO Archives of the Tamiment Library & Robert F. Wagner Archives PE 201, Bobst
Library, New York University, New York City).
122 U.S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Union Members Summary.” Released
January 26, 2017, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
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restrictions on union organizing. The Congress then passed other widely popular laws, such as
Medicare and Medicaid, which the AFL-CIO supported, but served more to aggregate support
for the Democratic Party, than benefit labor specifically.
Racial animus erupted at the end of the period. At its 1961 the AFL-CIO had gone on record
for equality among races. But despite the rhetoric, discrimination persisted within the AFL-CIO.
A few unions maintained racial discrimination clauses in their charters until 1964. Many more
unions practiced discrimination in particular cases, especially, but not exclusively, in the
apprentice programs for skilled trades. Thus, progressive union leaders faced a double task,
unions had to clean their own houses as they pushed the country at large to end white
supremacy.123 The unions were unable to overcome the racial divides that the New Deal had
been able to smooth over because of the change of strategy of southern legislators who broke
apart the Democratic coalition.
The legislative victories of Medicare and the Civil Rights Act, which George Meany
trumpeted in his 1965 Labor Day speech, endured. Johnson’s larger social vision, the
metaphorical “War on Poverty”, fell victim to the immense social and fiscal costs of the Vietnam
War. The war produced philosophical fissures within the Democratic coalition as anti-war
protest weakened Johnson’s political capital, returning a Republican to the presidency in 1968.
Politics, being the art of the possible, prevented even Lyndon Johnson with his landslide
victory from repealing the “right to work” section of Taft-Hartley. The gap between the promise
of the “War on Poverty” and its performance left many African-Americans frustrated with and
suspicious of the administration’s efforts.

123

57

Boyle, Organized Labor, 184.

The inability of the AFL-CIO to expand upon its racial gains in the southern states during
the war and the lack of political will of the Democratic Party in the 1930s to confront Jim Crow
laws came back to haunt both the AFL-CIO and the Civil Rights movement. A labor movement
with a militant philosophy might have demanded improved economic conditions for black
workers, leading change from a broad base of economic power. Instead, the Civil Rights
movement focused on political action, with the attendant problem that bedeviled the AFL-CIO,
isolation as a special interest.
In the November, 1966 issue of The AFL-CIO American Federationist “Labor’s Role:
Democracy on the Job” by Donald Slaiman, director of the federation's civil rights department,
summed up the AFL-CIO’s commitment to democracy, “When it comes to making democracy
complete for all Americans, this nation has to use Abraham Lincoln’s phrase, ‘much unfinished
work.’ Trade Unions are crucial to this task of making democracy complete because they are
closest to the people and are made up of people.”124 Like Julian West in Looking Backward,
one can see the lost opportunities of labor’s past to make “democracy complete”, but looking to
the future, perhaps a leaner union movement can shed its label as a “special interest” and rethink
its role in empowering “individual freedom” as a positive force in American society.

Donald Slaiman, “Labor’s Role: Democracy on the Job”, The AFL-CIO American
Federationist, November, 1966 (Box 1, AFL-CIO Archives of the Tamiment Library & Robert F.
Wagner Archives PE 201. Bobst Library, New York University. New York City)
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